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This study examines the correlation made by United States policy institutes, foreign
governments, and international media between al-Qaeda and Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s (HT)
potential for terrorism in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001.2 These
arguments are compared with the membership structure, ideological base, and
establishment of both HT and al-Qaeda. In this analysis, evidence points to the
inherent differences between the groups and the high unlikelihood that HT will resort
to violence or terrorism in the near future. After establishing these conclusions,
potential issues in analysis bias are discussed.
After the unexpected and tragic events of September 11, 2001, United States
policymakers, Intelligence Community members, and research institutes were very concerned
not just about future al-Qaeda attacks, but also which group may be on a “conveyor belt” to al-
Qaeda, or more generally, terrorism against the United States and its interests.3 There was
intense pressure on the President of the United States and on these groups to “get it right” and
protect America from harm. Less than a month after the attacks, on October 7, 2001, President
George W. Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom, bombing al-Qaeda training camps and
Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan.4 Many countries joined the United States with troops,
logistical support, and shared intelligence. These efforts marked the beginning of the Global
War on Terrorism, which fueled U.S. and foreign governments to set out against terrorists
worldwide. Since then, Central Asian governments, in particular, have been keen to label
opposition groups and extremists as terrorists.
Between 2003 and 2005, much literature was published about a group relatively unknown
to Americans, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), or The Party of Liberation as a potential terrorist
organization. News agency Rosbalt even asked, “Hizb ut-Tahrir to replace Al-Qaida?” in a 2003
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article.5 On the surface level, HT and al-Qaeda may have similar ideologies and goals because
both claim to work towards the active recreation of the Islamic Caliphate, a state connecting the
Muslim world ruled by an appointed Caliph. The last remnants of the historical Caliphate were
abolished during the end of the Ottoman Empire. Zeyno Baran, the primary advocate for the HT
“conveyor belt to terrorism” model, gained international attention in 2003 for comparing HT
with terrorism and even al-Qaeda. Her work is echoed in reporting from other international
policy institutes and media. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001 and even to some degree
before the start of the Iraq War on March 19, 2003, there were relatively few analyses of HT.
The anti-Semitic nature of HT, the potential for political mobilization, and the group’s methods
were frequent themes of these works. This report will consider the effects of the inattention such
early reports received.
First, this project will review other analyses, particularly by Baran, Cohen, and the
International Crisis Group (ICG), in relation to HT’s potential to use violence and weapons of
mass destruction, controversial recruitment and organizational structure of HT, and the
overarching goals of HT. Next, a summary of the Central Asian response to HT will be assessed.
After these critiques, issues that may have been sidelined in these analyses will be explored; the
inherent difference in the founding of al-Qaeda by Osama bin Laden and HT by Taqiuddin al-
Nabhani, al-Qaeda’s initial call to violence and HT’s refrain, the impact Sayyid Qutb had on
shaping radical political Islam, how HT and al-Qaeda define and use jihad in their methods, and
a deeper meaning behind why these groups want to reestablish the Caliphate. Upon review, this
study will explore these findings with Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism” model at a deeper
historical and psychological level. Evidence points to HT most likely not on the “conveyor belt”
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or “staircase” to al-Qaeda or to terrorism but perhaps towards heightened extremist philosophies
denouncing the policies of the West.6
This study seeks to expose these differences and clarify the separate structure,
background, and ideology between HT and al-Qaeda. As well, it argues that attempts to fit HT
into an al-Qaeda narrative have caused severe misrepresentations and false allegations of HT and
its members. The outcome has led to a greater secrecy of the group in some states and possibly
heightened anti-West rhetoric. Finally, the study urges those analyzing HT to reconsider the
effects of bias in reporting and to question assumptions about Islamist groups. Perhaps
researchers ought to look to history for guidance about a group’s intentions. HT may be
fundamentally a pan-Islamist group, but evidence in this report points to the connection to
terrorism or even future terrorist actions as weak. For this purpose, this study aims to shed light
as to the breadth of political Islam.
Post-9/11 Hizb-ut-Tahrir Analysis
Why Study HT Now?
Though HT was established over fifty years ago, (1953) most literature concerning the
group was written in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001.7 Before this date, many
Americans were unaware of al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden and his motivation for attacking U.S.
civilians. Another one of the more significant reasons for HT study predominantly post-9/11 is
that the membership level of HT remained relatively stagnant until the mid-1990s.8 With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, borders became more permeable between Central Asia states
and countries that were not part of the Soviet Union, like Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and China.
Conversely, the previously open borders among the Central Asian Soviet republics rather
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suddenly imposed divides among ethnic, economic, and cultural groups and caused transnational
border disputes. At the same time, the rise of internet access and personal computers in the
1990s enabled HT leaders to publish their leaflets and multimedia in harder to reach locations.
Awareness and membership increased, and now HT claims to have over one million members in
over 40 countries.9 Thus, because of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks, the collapse of the Soviet Union
lending itself to the revival of Islam in Central Asia, and the increase in internet activity that
helped with higher membership, scholarly publications concerning HT have increased only
recently.
With HT study becoming prominent only after the events of 9/11, it is important to
review contemporary analyses of HT and explore the findings of these post-9/11 researchers,
media, and governments. Later, this study will examine the argument that because of the intense
pressure to prevent another al-Qaeda group from emerging, many of these individuals and
entities attempted to fit HT into an al-Qaeda narrative. That is, because al-Qaeda’s founding,
ideology, and goals have been studied extensively by scholars today and on the surface seem
similar, these individuals and entities tried to force HT into a terrorism pattern that does not
correlate well.
Firstly, this study will review the primary arguments made for HT’s high potential for
and possible connection with terrorism. In particular, Zeyno Baran and Ariel Cohen have briefed
the U.S. House Armed Services Committee: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities about “Combating Al Qaida and Militant Jihadist Threats.”10
Zeyno Baran, “Conveyor Belt to Terrorism” Argument
Perhaps the most current and widely cited monograph that suggests HT is on the
“conveyor belt” to terrorism is Zeyno Baran’s, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s Political Insurgency.”
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Published in December 2004 by The Nixon Center, a conservative Washington, D.C. think tank,
this report is based on numerous interviews with Western and Central Asian government
officials, various analysts of non-governmental organizations and with Hizb-ut-Tahrir
members.11 Preceding this monograph are Baran’s research presentation report and article
introducing the “conveyor belt” finding. Throughout these reports, Baran extensively reviews
the history and structure of HT in an effort to understand the root of HT’s ideology because she
and the 9/11 Commission view the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as not just against terrorists
but against radical Islamist ideologies.12 Her primary finding is that HT’s nonviolent rhetoric is
essentially a “mask” covering the group’s objectives which are “only…achieved through
violence.”13 She also suggests policy initiatives for each Central Asian state, China, Russia,
Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the United States. Yet, Baran’s policy suggestions are heavily rooted in
her work with the same Central Asian governments that are notorious for skewing country
statistics. So, this paper will try to focus on the narrative concerning trends in HT recruitment
and Baran’s rationale that HT is on a “conveyor belt” to terrorism.
References to al-Qaeda
Baran duly notes that “lumping” HT with al-Qaeda or other international terrorist
organizations is a “mistake,” yet compares their charters.14 For instance, she writes,
Like al-Qaeda, whose founding charter defines it as the “pioneering vanguard” of Islamic
movements, HT declares itself to be the “ideological vanguard” of the Islamist
movements. Just as al-Qaeda “showed the way” for other armed groups by destroying
two of America’s most prominent landmarks, HT blazes a path for other radical groups
by destroying America’s most prominent ideological principles: democracy and
capitalism.15
thereby emphasizing not just the GWOT but the war of ideologies and that HT is, in her view, a
“political insurgency” bent on leading ideological revolutions throughout the Muslim world.16
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HT will use violence
The ultimate difference between al-Qaeda and HT is the use of violence. HT members,
HT literature, and other media profusely proclaim that HT is peaceful and as spokesman Wasim
Doureihi states,
We completely reject the employing of any violence or aggression from a party
perspective. We completely reject that. That has been our position from day one. But the
assertion and inference that we in some way would advocate violence towards any
individual irrespective of their creed is a charge we strongly reject.17
While the word “peaceful” may be a subjective term, the group’s messages regarding Jews and
Western leadership are widely considered hateful, as evidenced by Germany’s banning of HT on
the grounds of anti-Semitism. Yet, Doureihi’s message of nonviolence is clear. However, Baran
forecasts that, “HT may be non-violent, but it certainly is not peaceful. Though it is not engaged
in violence, its ideology is violent. If HT ever takes power in a country, it will certainly launch
military attacks.”18 Baran continues:
Hizb ut-Tahrir as an organization is not likely to take up terrorism. Terrorist acts are
simply not part of HT’s mission, which is to serve as an ideological and political training
ground for Islamists. In order to best accomplish this, HT will need to remain non-
violent, acting within the legal system of the countries in which it operates. Moreover,
HT does not need to become a terrorist group—winning hearts and minds is a much more
effective method towards achieving its ultimate goal.19
Ariel Cohen of The Heritage Foundation projects, “When a critical mass of cells is achieved,
according to its doctrine, Hizb may move to take over a country in preparation for the
establishment of the Caliphate. Such a takeover would likely be bloody and violent.”20
Further confusing the matter is that an Arabic language HT-associated publication, Al-
Waie, has a fatwa, or religious decree, allegedly allowing the use of suicide attacks and other
forms of violence against “unbelievers,” according to Baran. A definite relationship of HT to
this magazine is unknown, as some party activists claim “Al-Waie is not the official publication
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of Hizb-ut-Tahrir...but the party maintains close contacts with the monthly,” and other
researchers claim that the publication is in fact directly from HT.21 There is no mention of Al-
Waie on HT’s official English-language information and media office websites, but one
explanation may be that the articles are not translated in English on the internet.22
The International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent and non-partisan organization,
notes that HT’s opposition to violence “is conditional, not absolute,” with the conditions
centered on the last stage of commencing the Caliphate.23 Citing Suha Taji-Farouki’s A
Fundamental Quest, the ICG report states that HT founder al-Nabhani’s view was that “a regime
could be brought down through acts of civil disobedience…Alternatively, it could be toppled
through a military coup” who would then give power to HT.24 To be sure, determining whether
today’s HT would or could commit any violent acts, let alone utilizing weapons of mass
destruction, based on al-Nabhani’s statements from the 1950s remains a challenge.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Link
Another argument in HT analysis that may lend comparisons to al-Qaeda is the feasibility
or attractiveness of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Baran also suggests that HT has
shown increased interest in WMD, and that interest piqued after U.S. and coalition forces failed
to recover them in Iraq. Additionally, she writes that because Central Asia has nuclear weapon
neighbors of Pakistan, Russia, and India, there is the possibility of “loose WMD material” which
is especially “attractive” for HT.25 Cohen makes U.S. policy recommendations of preventing the
“development and production of weapons of mass destruction in the region, to preclude them
from falling into the hands of rogue regimes or terrorists,” neither of which HT can be defined as
in the United States.26 He also states that the U.S. and allies “must do everything possible to
avoid” a HT “takeover of any Central Asian state” because the group could have “access to the
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expertise and technology to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.”27 Mayer counters that
Cohen’s statements create “an artificial link” with the “hot topic” of weapons of mass
destruction, suggesting that “when it comes to Hizb ut-Tahrir, his [Cohen’s] assessments look
conjectural, despite their boldness”28 The ICG states that if the Caliphate were established, HT
“should embrace modern military technology, including nuclear weapons” to follow through
with HT theory in which HT has a “duty to pursue jihad against the State of Israel and its
destruction.”29
Recruitment Techniques Separate, Not Equal
There is also an apparent controversy regarding how HT recruits new members,
especially in HT Britain. According to Baran and HT publications, a party member meets with
prospective individual and exposes that person to HT ideology and methods. That person then
begins meeting with others in a small study group for six months to three years, however long it
takes before a person becomes “ideologically, theologically, and spiritually” committed to HT.30
At this point, the prospective member is offered a full, official membership status in HT’s
organization.31 In a BBC Newsnight feature, BBC allegedly had access to an undercover mole
who infiltrated an HT circle in South London. This mole reported that his final step before being
offered a full membership was to pledge allegiance to the group and to “intimidate” three youths
on a nearby street into giving him £3.32 When interviewed by BBC, current HT Britain
Chairman Executive Dr. Abdul Wahid denied that these men the mole had contact with were
actually in HT and that if he met individuals such as these, he would ask them to leave the group.
In fact, when trying to explain his views and defend his group on BBC Newsnight, Wahid was
repeatedly interrupted by correspondent Jeremy Paxman:
Wahid: Let me finish—
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Paxman: No, no I really want to be clear about this …Your position really is that
independently members of the Muslim community have come to us and made up
accusations about your organization including criminality? Entirely made up?
Independently?
Wahid: Our organization has nothing to do with criminality…33
Paxman’s interview of Wahid was criticized by HT Britain and even BBC Newsnight reported
that it had received many complaints that the “film was politically motivated and that we [BBC
Newsnight] had set out with an agenda to discredit Hizb ut-Tahrir.”34 BBC Newsnight Editor,
Peter Barron, stood by the programming on radical Islam and stated that the segment detailed
“several accusations” about HT but that ultimately Wahid “was given an ample opportunity to
put across his position and address the key issues raised by the film.”35 HT Britain called
attention to the “shadowy reconstructions and sinister background music” that “sensationalized
the story” in addition to Newsnight connecting terrorism with “non-violent Islamic political work
and the call for a Caliphate in the Muslim world.”36
Is Calling HT Groups “Cells” Appropriate?
It is widely acknowledged that HT typically recruits college-aged persons with individual
contact and then small study groups. This familiarity, in context with words like “extremism”
and “secretive cells” may facilitate the reader’s mental bridge over to terrorist and al-Qaeda
cells.37 However, many college organizations gain membership in this manner. For example,
American collegiate Bible study groups may engage in student-led worship sessions, group
scripture readings, and one-on-one discipleships, where an older student mentors a new recruit
and encourages higher levels of involvement.38
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These situations are parallel to HT recruitment in British universities, but instead of
labeling the groups as “Hizb-ut-Tahrir Quran Study,” or as HT Britain calls them, “Study
Circles,” the media and scholars have called them Hizb-ut-Tahrir “secretive cells,”
“indoctrination cells,” or even “clandestine cells.”39 This study argues that although Westerners,
in this case, may not approve of the ideology and methods of HT, by assigning words typically
associated with terrorist networks, they are doing HT a disservice in branding them as such. HT
is, by compulsion, a more secretive group in the Middle East and Central Asia, where admitting
membership goes hand in hand with prison.40 However, a supposed cell structure makes rallies,
conferences, and media relations offices surprising, to say the least. In 2007, more than 100,000
HT supporters filled a stadium in Indonesia. Yet, in Pakistan, public rallies and demonstrations
are held in support of HT, but HT members are “forbidden by their leaders to participate in any
public event” for fear of members revealing their identity and being repressed.41
Prior to September 11, 2001, some al-Qaeda cells, including the infamous “Hamburg
Cell” were formed based on preexisting bonds of community, friendship, and values.42 Led by
the intelligent, dogmatic Mohammed Atta, the “Hamburg Cell,” as it became known, was
comprised of at least eight extremists who initially wanted to join the jihad in Chechnya. When
the four key members of the group, Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah were traveling by train,
they coincidentally met a man who convinced them to train in Afghanistan prior to fighting.
Once in Afghanistan, these Hamburg friends became part of al-Qaeda and were personally
selected by Osama bin Laden to lead the 9/11 plot. The 9/11 Commission states that the speed in
which the cell leadership was formed “is remarkable,” but also clarifies that the planning of the
plane hijacking plot had been in the works since Khalid Shaik Mohammed’s proposal in 1996.43
Granted, most of the “al-Qaeda hardcore” were “many of the pre-eminent militants active around
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the world” that bin Laden had attracted between 1996 and 2001.44 Other members in al-Qaeda
were leftover international mujahideen from the Soviet war against Afghanistan.45
These examples of HT study groups formed in university outreach initiatives and of the
“Hamburg Cell” highlight that for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, radicalization usually happens
within a small group which then joins a jihadist movement. HT appears to be different from this
pattern because the study circles are formed by bringing together individuals to join its cause.
This one-on-one recruitment method for HT study circles appears common in both the United
Kingdom and Central Asia. The study circles are helpful in fostering interpersonal relationships
and convenient in societies in which HT is banned. At the other end of the spectrum, HT large
gatherings, like the stadium in Indonesia or organized protests in London and Jerusalem, are
useful in raising broad awareness to the international community and in gaining momentum for
HT’s Caliphate movement.
Goals: Viewpoint of Scholars & Media
After September 11, 2001, some scholars seemed to also fit the goals of HT into an al-
Qaeda narrative. For example, Ariel Cohen lists HT’s “proclaimed goal” as “jihad against
America and the overthrow of existing political regimes and their replacement with a Caliphate,”
when HT, while anti-United States and anti-West, does not explicitly claim anything in English
as a jihad against the U.S. on its official websites.46 The ICG concurs, plainly stating that HT
“does not call for terrorist actions against America.”47 Furthermore, Cohen suggests that “Hizb’s
goal is to smash the existing state apparatus, not become a player within it.”48 In the open
societies of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Indonesia, Australia, the United States, and
others, HT has somewhat integrated into society in that it functions in public meetings and rallies
with established leadership.49 HT’s primary goal is to reestablish the Caliphate in the traditional
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lands of the Middle East and Central Asia, and not in any of the above countries. By using the
charged word “smash,” Cohen injects a violent overtone to the nature of HT. While HT’s
method of waiting for public opinion in a country to become predominantly HT-minded may
seem naïve or idealist to some, it nevertheless does not equal any sort of “smashing” of the “state
apparatus.”50 The U.S. government now discourages the use of the word “Caliphate” in
reference to al-Qaeda’s objectives because the word has so-called “positive implications” that the
U.S. government does not want to recognize.51
Central Asian Government Reactions to HT
The Ferghana Valley, the intersection of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, is
known for ethnic violence and rising Islamic militancy. HT is a part of this trend; it functions in
the Valley, and most of its members seem to be ethnic Uzbeks. In Uzbekistan, largely
considered the ideological stronghold of Hizb-ut-Tahrir efforts in the early 2000s, many
allegations of Hizb-ut-Tahrir members as accomplices to crimes and even as suicide bombers
and terrorists are made by the state government.52 In the spring of 2004, there were a series of
suicide bombings and house attacks in the capital city of Tashkent. Uzbek Prosecutor-General
Rashid Qodirov claimed that the events were caused by HT and the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and even suggested that al-Qaeda had a hand in the incidents.53 However, the
ICG states that “there is no proof of its [HT’s] involvement in terrorist activities in Central Asia
or elsewhere” and also that government positions regarding HT are labeled as “contradictory and
often ineffective.”54 As Ahmed Rashid argues, Uzbekistan is eager to make a connection
between al-Qaeda and HT because the governmental torture of Islamic militants could be more
justifiable. Furthermore, Rashid points out that human rights campaigns are concerned that
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Uzbekistan may be leveraging its Western alliance with a higher intensity of repression against
its own people.55
Conversely, HT’s popularity has declined over the past couple of years, in large part due
to the Karimov regime's crackdown of it. Karimov has grouped HT with al-Qaeda, the IMU, al-
Jihad, and other terrorist movements. When the various revolutions started in some of the
former Soviet republics, Karimov and other Central Asian leaders banned HT in fear of losing
their own power. Karimov held many of the people handing out HT leaflets in prison and
frequently tortured them. In one particularly extreme case, two men suspected of belonging to
HT and distributing literature were boiled to death.56 The Karimov regime’s brutality was
enough to dissuade many Uzbeks from joining HT. In general, the Uzbek recruits felt that
joining the nonviolent group, only to be tortured in very violent ways, was not worth the risks.
In the neighboring state of Kyrgyzstan, new initiatives are underway to “stamp out” HT by
imposing harsher penalties for promoting the group and through trying to reduce the flow of
finances to the group. As Jolbors Jorobekov, the former director of the Kyrgyz State Agency on
Religious Affairs, explains, “when they have money, they increase their recruitment
activities…and when they don’t have the finances, they again operate quietly, out of sight.”57
The number of HT associated arrests has been rising since 2002, but it is unclear if this correlates
with a rise of membership in Central Asia.
Today, many influential Central Asian religious leaders and HT members have serious
reservations about the feasibility and intentions of reviving the Caliphate. The former Mufti of
Kyrgyzstan, Sadiq Qari Kamal al-Deen, says that, “70% of their [HT’s] ideas are good…. they're
for social justice and education and against prostitution and drugs. But 30% are bad ideas - the
revival of the Caliphate and their opposition to democracy, for instance.”58 In other words, al-
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Deen’s opinion about HT is that the group should continue with its humanitarian and social
society campaigns in Kyrgyzstan—and implies that the group’s primary campaign in the region
is not reestablishing the Caliphate. In 2004, Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis, an assistant professor at
the Kazakh Institute of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research, found that, “for
Uzbeks outside Uzbekistan, HT and the Wahhabi movement are expressions of Uzbek
identity.”59
Another issue with HT’s connections in Central Asia is that current HT literature
distributed in the region can be dissimilar to that of other countries. Rather than heavily focusing
on the reunification of the Caliphate, these leaflets normally criticize the widely unpopular
regime in power, capitalism, United States foreign policy, the United Kingdom, and Zionists and
the state of Israel.60 Moreover, there is no evidence that the HT groups of the region were truly
receiving direct orders from the organization’s public headquarters in London. Baran notes that
the HT country leadership can authorize leaflet publication, and other reports indicate that some
Central Asian HT leaflets are translated into regional languages from Arabic ones of the Middle
East.61 Rashid also claims that the technology used to distribute the leaflets and other HT
propaganda is “very rare in Central Asia, where people have little access to technology. Much of
HT’s equipment was funded and imported from abroad, indicating probable collusion with senior
bureaucrats in the customs department.”62
Review of al-Qaeda and Hizb-ut-Tahrir
Legacy of Sayyid Qutb in Shaping Political Islam
Sayyid Qutb’s writings have had a profound impact on Islamist thought. The crisis of
faith that Qutb, an Egyptian philosopher and educator, had when he experienced life abroad in
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the United States in 1948 dramatically made way for his extremist views against the West and
for an Islamic revival. From studying in a small Colorado liberal arts college to researching in
California and Washington, DC, Qutb became very uneasy with a Western society that lacked
outward faith and devotion to God. He witnessed rapid American post-war economic progress,
racial segregation, and a sexually curious public. His turn to radicalization was certain. He was
resolute on joining the Society of the Muslim Brothers after hearing of the assassination of his
peer, al-Banna and after a meeting with a person likely trying to recruit him into the Central
Intelligence Agency.63 When Qutb finally set foot back in Egypt, his message was clear, “the
white man in Europe or America is our number-one enemy…the enemy of humanity…[our
children] should destroy him at the first opportunity…”.64
His seminal work, Milestones, sets the tone with, “Mankind today is on the brink of a
precipice…,” and establishes that the morality of society is in grave danger.65 He continues to
state that, “[The Western world] knows that it does not possess anything which will satisfy its
own conscience and justify its existence,” and proclaims that, “it is essential for mankind to have
new leadership!”66 By this, Qutb calls for renewed efforts to establish a Muslim community,
which leads the way for the Islamic Caliphate. The “milestones” that Qutb’s title refers to are
the steps necessary for or the “signposts” that indicate progress towards the revival of Islam.
As Qutb views the world, it is “steeped in Jahiliyyah”, or “ignorance of the Divine
guidance,” and only a “revivalist movement” will bring about this change towards God.67 Qutb
went on to become the “chief spokesman” of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954 and “its latest
‘martyr’ in 1966,” which eventually fueled the fires of revenge for al-Qaeda and strengthened
HT’s resolve to rise above violence to achieve their goals.68
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Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Founding
In 1953, about 35 years prior to the founding of al-Qaeda, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a judge,
al-Azhar graduate, and high school religious teacher in the Court of Appeals in al-Quds,
established Hizb-ut-Tahrir in a Jordanian-controlled portion of East Jerusalem.69 Though not as
much is known about al-Nabhani as Osama bin Laden, it is clear that al-Nabhani was vehemently
anti-colonialist and blamed “Islam’s decline” on the “submission of the Ummah to greedy
colonial powers”.70 Here, the Ummah refers to the Muslim world, and it is sometimes
interpreted as the Arab world. Al-Nabhani believed that converting to an Islamic way of life was
the answer to this decline, not “nationalist or economic policy prescriptions.”71 In fact, al-
Nabhani joined the Muslim Brotherhood, an established Islamic fundamentalist group, but
“found its ideology too moderate and too accommodating of the West,” which planted the
ideological seeds for his own organization.72 HT’s records even indicate that he “exchanged
views with Sayyid Qutb” at this time.73 His 1950 publication, “The Treatise of the Arab,”
further explained his vision of “establishing the Islamic state in Arab territories and afterwards in
non-Arab Islamic territories,” which is the reunification of the historic Caliphate and expanding
its reach.74 Three years later, he formally founded HT in writing “The Concepts of Hizb-ut-
Tahrir”, recruited disillusioned extremists of the Muslim Brotherhood, and reached out to
individuals in the Muslim community by teaching them HT’s philosophy.75
In the mid-1950s, al-Nabhani encouraged cooperation with other groups, like the Muslim
Brotherhood. Ultimately, these efforts failed, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood were
mostly in competition, and the party ‘did not want to lose its distinctive identity.’”76 HT spread
throughout Egypt and Jordan, but was then accused of various coup attempts in the 1960s and
1970s and forced to be more underground.77 In the late 1960s, HT leaders were unsuccessful in
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establishing a major presence in Turkey, which was a significant setback in the quest for the
Caliphate. Turkey is, in some sense, a crown jewel in HT’s Caliphate strategy because the
Caliph offices were last disbanded there. These early failures, on top of Middle Eastern
countries banning HT, prompted HT leaders to spread the group to Europe and avoid major
persecution in the 1970s.78 In particular, HT offices grew heavily in England and Germany.79
By the 1980s, HT’s message became more aggressive in denouncing Israel and Zionism.80 Also
during this time period, HT expanded to Indonesia.81 In the 1990s, HT continued to increase its
membership size and take advantage of the newly independent states of Central Asia.82 Overall,
from HT’s founding until the present day, it seems that HT’s predominant strategy for
establishing the Caliphate is to gain the most popular support by establishing branches
worldwide. Apart from HT’s global reach, it is unclear how much HT’s message has
dramatically changed and just how organized the regional branches are in respect to national and
international leaders.
Al-Qaeda: Founding
In the summer of 1988, a small circle of men set a goal “to lift the word of God, to make
His religion victorious” in their group they named al-Qaeda.83 Yet, the name, “al-Qaeda” had
been used worldwide by many of the Islamic radicals during the mid-1980s to define their cause
in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.84 Interestingly enough, the “most extreme” of the
Afghani fighters used the word “al-Qaeda” to describe those who believed the struggle would
endure beyond Soviet withdrawal.85
According to Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese informant and witness in the trial of the 1998
East African embassy bombings, al-Qaeda’s initial goals of continuing jihad outside of
Afghanistan did not include the United States or the West. Rather, this new organization
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pledged to set goals to bring about “an Islamic revolution to the countries of the Ummah”
through violence.86 Al-Fadl, a new recruit to al-Qaeda, joined in late 1989, when there were just
about a dozen members. Bin Laden, named the ‘emir’ of al-Fadl’s new group, wanted to
concentrate the “alliance” formed during the war against the Soviet Union before the militants
diverged to individual interests.87
Indeed, Osama bin Laden always intended al-Qaeda to use violence in its campaign
against the West, as evidenced by a short-lived precursor group: al-Qaeda al-Askariya, meaning
military base.88 During the end of the Soviet-Afghanistan war, the work of this group was
divided into short and long-term training, with those who completed long-term training to be the
first members of the militant al-Qaeda.89 However, men who trained in al-Qaeda’s camps and
pledged allegiance to bin Laden did not commit targeted attacks until ten years later in the Kenya
and Tanzania embassy bombings. Instead, during these ten years, al-Qaeda trained men mostly
created unorganized “havoc” in their home countries while bin Laden touted his group’s strength
and war against America.90
Osama bin Laden had always been a devout Muslim, and even in his early school days in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, he was known among his friends for his piety.91 Not only did he pray five
times daily and fast twice weekly, but he also admonished the material interests of his friends
and quizzed them on the teachings of the Quran.92 Growing up as one of the offspring of a well-
endowed and well-connected father enabled Osama to embrace religious study and forgo
monetary hardships. Although Osama’s father, Mohammad bin Laden, divorced his mother
when Osama was four or five years old and died in a plane crash just five years later, Osama
maintained a very modest lifestyle despite the immense family wealth.93 Young Osama’s piety
increasingly steered him to more conservative and traditional Islamic circles in his community of
Krause 19
Jeddah.94 In Jeddah, Abdallah Azzam and Mohammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb’s brother, lectured at
King Abdul Aziz University while bin Laden was enrolled.95 Bin Laden’s course of study was in
economics, which would later prove troubling to Islamic scholars when he claimed to issue
fatwas that only certain religious scholars are authorized to make.96
Inspired by Azzam’s passionate recruiting and feeling an intense calling to defend Islam
in the mountains of Afghanistan from a godless empire, bin Laden disobeyed his mother and
Saudi Arabian authorities and embarked on the new path of joining the mujahideen.97
Mujahideen, or “fighters driven by jihad”, came from all across the Muslim world to defend
Islam and the Muslims of Afghanistan.98 Bin Laden’s connections with the Muslim
Brotherhood, some of his late father’s money, and particular ability for fundraising enabled him
to be a natural leader of a new group. Azzam viewed jihad as a defensive tactic, much like
Osama bin Laden did at the beginning of the Gulf War. However, bin Laden changed his belief
to a violent, offensive jihad by the end of the war.99 Teaming up with Ayman al-Zawahiri, a
physician who had been tortured brutally after Sadat’s assassination, bin Laden was able to plant
the roots for a group that hoped to have global impact.100
What is important about the stories of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri is that the roots of their
terrorist activities began in terrorism by responding to violence in Afghanistan and Egypt,
respectively. HT’s founder, al-Nabhani, responded to his perceived lack of devotion and
religiosity in the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Qaeda evolved from the Afghani mujahideen, not
simply the writings of Qutb or Muhammad abd al-Salaam Faraj. In fact, al-Zawahiri’s
beginnings as a militant Islamist began in the Islamic Jihad, which launched terrorist training
camps in the early 1990s and bombed federal buildings in Saudi Arabia in 1996.101
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Al-Qaeda: Call to Violence
Al-Qaeda has only had the desire to achieve political change through violence. In The al-
Qaeda Manual confiscated during a 2002 search in an al-Qaeda member home in Manchester,
England, the casus belli is outlined as a retribution for the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924.
The Islamic Caliphate of 1924 was essentially the Ottoman Empire until Kemal Ataturk
secularized Turkey and divided the Caliphate.
After the fall of our orthodox Caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after the expelling the
colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the
Moslem nation…[the rulers] started to fragment the essence of the Islamic nation by
trying to eradicate its Moslem identity.102
In explaining that the Muslim identity was, and is still threatened, al-Qaeda has established its
defensive, rather than offensive stance. As well, the psychological forces upon these young
Muslim men is clear; a colonialist government has, and will continue, to make states secular. In
their view, the only way to protect their spiritual destiny is to fight: “These young men [Haraka
Al-Islamiya (Islamic Movement) youth] realized that an Islamic government would never be
established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or make a truce with unbelief,
but rather confronts it.”103
When Osama bin Laden and the other four others issued the 1996 fatwa, “Declaration of
War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” none of them had the
religious authority to do so.104 In Islam, only al-ulama scholars, or those who have completed
rigorous study of the Quran and the hadith are qualified to issue fatwas. A mujtahid, or highly
learned Islamic scholar, may issue independent Quranic opinions.105
What is Jihad?
The word “jihad” can be translated as “to strive, to struggle, or to exert oneself” but the
greater meaning for Muslims and Islamists is controversial.106 Both al-Qaeda and HT use the
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term in different ways, and each faction in the Muslim world has its own interpretation.
Counterterrorism expert Marc Sageman classifies two types of jihad, non-violent and violent. As
he notes, there is an important distinction between “traditional jihad” and “global Salafi jihad.”
The “traditional jihad,” also known as the “greater jihad” can be loosely defined as “the
individual nonviolent striving to live a good Muslim life, following God’s will.” However, the
“lesser jihad” gives way to the global Salafi jihad. The lesser jihad is the “violent struggle” for
Islam that is called for to expand the Islamic community throughout the world for greater world
order.107 Rashid notes that “global jihadi movements…ignore the greater jihad advocated by The
Prophet and adopt the lesser jihad as a complete political and social philosophy;” while defining
the lesser jihad as a potential means to mobilize a political and social struggle in response to
rebellion against unjust rulers.108 Sageman labels the contemporary form of lesser jihad the
“global Salafi jihad” called forth by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, and Sayyid Qutb.109
As early as 1954, Sayyid Qutb had declared jihad on Britain during his Egyptian
imprisonment. To Qutb, the call for jihad was necessary because Gamal Abdel Nasser was in the
process of negotiating a treaty to end occupation.110 One chapter of Milestones is devoted to the
concept of jihad and why it is necessary to engage in it to save the Ummah. Yet, Qutb states
that, “the Islamic Jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way
in which it is conducted” giving a somewhat peaceful-sounding description of his jihad.111 Yet,
when describing how to enact this jihad, he writes, “those who have usurped the authority of God
and are oppressing God’s creatures are not going to give up their power merely through
preaching...” suggesting that the West will not just change by persuasion, but with action.112
Qutb continues to state that the concept of jihad bis saif, or “striving through fighting” is
acceptable, and fighting for “defensive war” needs to be expanded upon.113 That is, Qutb
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believes the Islamic jihad he calls for is just because the he and his followers are defending man
“against all those elements which limit his freedom.”114 To be more precise, Qutb explains that
“the twin purposes of jihad are to cleanse Islam of the impurifying influence of the West, and to
fight the West using political, economic, and religio-cultural weapons—the same weapons the
West allegedly uses against Islam.”115 Abd Al-Salam Faraj’s The Neglected Duty, claims that
the “ultimate object” is to have a “world governed by shari’a” and to do so, Muslims should
return to practicing jihad as “the essential means for reviving Islam.”116 Faraj’s work “seemed a
serious challenge to the interpreters of the Islamic tradition, the ulama (religious sages) who
were, indeed, chided by the government for having been lax in their responsibilities,” and the
Egyptian government reacted strongly to counter the relatively unknown man’s text.117 Faraj’s
group, al-Jihad, was responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and Faraj’s writings were
made famous after the Egyptian government issued a response to The Neglected Duty.
Burke notes that jihad is not “merely a tactic aimed at achieving a specific worldly goal,”
but rather a “part of the cosmic struggle.”118 That is, Burke utilizes Qutb’s statement, “the scope
of this struggle is not limited to this earth or to this life. The observers of this struggle are not
merely a generation of men,” and thus it is not necessarily violence, but a Muslim’s will and
Allah’s will to ever hold jihad.119 On August 8, 1996, Osama bin Laden’s declaration of “War
Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (Expel the Infidels from the
Arab Peninsula)” called for jihad.120 Bin Laden believed that the United States was controlling
the Islamic world and had divided the Ummah (Muslim Community). Because of these factors,
Bin Laden sought not just revenge over these misdeeds, but a war; the United States had already
begun a “war on Allah, his Messenger, and Muslims.”121 Indeed, al-Qaeda goes on to persuade
youths that Allah is ordering them to the frontlines of Jihad, and that because no other cause
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could be greater than Allah’s, they are compelled to fight. The following excerpt from The al-
Qaeda Manual, containing a verse from the Quran, illustrates the commitment that these youths
make to Allah and to Jihad:
The young came to prepare themselves for Jihad [holy war], commanded by the majestic
Allah's order in the holy Koran. [Koranic verse:] “Against them make ready your
strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the
hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides whom ye may not
know, but whom Allah doth know.”122
Ayman al-Zawahiri extends this message and call for Salafi jihad in Knights Under the
Prophet’s Banner, going as far to say that the new jihad will be waged between Islam and the
United Nations, friendly rulers of Muslim peoples, and even international relief agencies.123 He
also writes that “A jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator, where its
seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics and
organizational matters,” and continues on to make a strong distinction between a jihadist
movement and nationalism.124 This commentary is also useful for the argument towards a
Caliphate, the Islamic government that al-Qaeda allegedly strives for. If this sentence were
altered to read, “An Islamist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator, where its
seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in politics and organizational
matters,” it would handily sound like an HT leaflet.
HT’s definition of “jihad” is more vague and flexible than al-Qaeda’s, which may be
purposeful to allow party leaders a greater range of options to lead their group nearer to the
Caliphate. Taqiuddin al-Nabhani’s foundational piece of HT philosophy, the “Concepts of Hizb-
ut-Tahrir” discusses jihad as “...a war against anyone who stands in the face of the Islamic
Da'wah whether he is an aggressor or not…” and also as “…the removal of any obstacle standing
in the face of the Da'wah, i.e. the call to Islam, and the fight for its sake; for the sake of
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Allah…”.125 These statements give the impression that HT’s jihad is more localized than the
“cosmic struggle” that Burke discusses for al-Qaeda and is also supportive of a war against
civilians.126 Then again, looking further in al-Nabhani’s piece it seems that HT, as its members
claim, will not use violence to defend itself or be offensive to others. Al-Nabhani insists on
separating the ideas of jihad from material actions in writing “that the Party does not use material
power to defend itself or as a weapon against the rulers is of no relevance to the subject of jihad,
because jihad has to continue till the Day of Judgment...” but curiously states that “whenever
there is a Muslim emir who declares jihad to enhance the Word of Allah (swt) and mobilises the
people to do that, the members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir will respond in their capacity as Muslims in the
country where the general call to arms was proclaimed.”127 Al-Nabhani even warns that
Muslims will “…fight the enemy and repel them” and that jihad is a “materialistic action” that
has “spiritual value” and “achieves a tangible result.”128
It appears that modern-day HT will not consider materialistic actions and jihad continues
until the “Day of Judgment” occurs.129 This day, according to al-Nabhani references, is when a
Muslim will be questioned about his or her faithfulness to Allah and His prohibitions and
commands. So, while a jihad reminiscent of the Greater Jihad is ongoing, a Muslim emir may
call for jihad and HT may feel obligated to respond.130 Bin Laden considers himself an emir,
despite his non-religious course of study.131 This begs the question of whether HT can pick and
choose which emirs' calls to jihad they respond to. Bin Laden says that his jihad is a defensive
one, much like Qutb's interpretation. Another point of contention is the "materialistic action"
idea that al-Nabhani says is jihad, and that HT is most adamant against doing.
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Shared Goal: The Caliphate
Both al-Qaeda and HT proclaim their goal of reconnecting the Ummah with the ideal
Islamic society, or Caliphate.132 However, the Muslim rule of law in the Caliphate government
is not directly addressed in the Quran or in the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad.133
Traditionally, the Islamic Caliphate is headed by a Caliph, a person selected by the people for his
piety and “competence and the confidence of the mass in him.”134 Ideally, the Caliphate served
the people with “unity in the ‘brotherhood of religion’ and ‘equality in the rights and duties.’”135
However, since the Caliphate’s birth in the seventh century, it has been stricken with a king-like
family “with arbitrary power” which did not share its wealth with the citizens and rejected the
peaceful tenets of the Caliphate for corruption and authoritarian rule.136 As Mitchell notes, the
difference between an “Islamic order” and a “Muslim state” can be reduced to whether the
society implements shari’a law.137 The “Islamic Order” adheres to shari’a law, socially and
religiously, whereas a “Muslim state” need not have shari’a law. At the same time, even the
definition of shari’a law is bit murky as there is no codified set of laws of shari’a. Fuller plainly
states that “a single shari’a doesn’t exist” and that it is a combination of interpretations of human
understanding of the Quran and the lifestyle of the Prophet.138 Shari’a, meaning path of God, is
a set of “divinely revealed general principles, directives, and values” and Muslims sought to
adhere to these principles in the centuries after Prophet Mohammad’s death partly to limit the
powers of the Caliph.139 Fuller concedes that “shari’a law…can be easily abused and has been
abused…to suppress political opposition and inhibit spiritual growth,” which appears to fit the
pattern of so-called Islamic states.140 As well, Taji-Fourouki speaks to the flexibility of Islamic
governments that have “little problem accommodating their Islamic paradigms” to the states they
uphold.141 Other theorists, he remarks, have less compliant views that the Islamic state is a
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“substantive part of the shari’a; it is not merely a technique.”142 HT and al-Qaeda Caliphate
philosophy likely falls into this latter group. In fact, HT founder al-Nabhani avoids using the
“problematic term ‘sovereignty of God’” and employs “‘sovereignty of shari’a’ instead, adding
that ‘authority’ is vested in the Ummah.”143
According to the Muslim Brotherhood, which al-Qaeda leaders al-Zawahiri and bin
Laden have regarded for many of their viewpoints on the Caliphate, the political organization of
an Islamic state was bound by the Quran as the constitution, the government as consultation
(shura), and the executive ruler’s commitment to Islam and to the welfare of his people.144
What do terrorists want? How does this apply to al-Qaeda and HT?
Dr. Gunter Rohrmoser, who studied West German terrorists of the 1970s, described the
nature of terrorist wants in this excerpt:
What do the terrorists want? They want The Revolution, a total transformation of all
existing condition, a new form of human existence, an entirely new relationship of people
to each other, and also of people to nature. They want the total and radical breach with
all that is, and with all historical continuity. Without a doubt they are utopians. The
source of their (self-provided) legitimacy is the utopia which they want to make real, and
it is the same utopia that makes them regard all historical and ideological factors as
illusions.145
While the terrorists described in Rohrmoser’s statement are not Islamic and have
decidedly different targets, the philosophical similarities are striking. The “utopia” that both
Hizb-ut-Tahrir and al-Qaeda aim for is the Caliphate, a gathering of Islamic people and nations
throughout the Middle East, and eventually, the world. This Islamic “utopia” is a relative
fantasy; the general Middle Eastern Caliphate was in existence from the sixth century until 1924,
with its fall due to the Turks. However, beyond the year 850, the Caliphate that HT and al-
Qaeda speak of was mainly nominal in nature. In 1924, Kemal Ataturk removed the last
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remnants of the Caliphate, which were symbolic offices typically used for foreign policy
initiatives.146
Many scholars argue that the Caliphate or another Islamic system of government and law
is not wholly different from the authoritarian governments that most of the proposed Caliphate
lands are in presently.147 Aside from the semantic differences in the naming of offices and the
official requirement of devout Islamic customs, the 1924 Caliphate system is, altogether, not
very different from the current model. The romantic notion of the Caliphate from 850 is difficult
to conceive of in present society. Despite a draft HT constitution outlining the rule of law, it is
yet to be seen how economic and social services could be provided for its citizens. Al-Nabhani
viewed the Islamic state as having a Caliph elected by an Islamic council, who “would control
the army, political system, economy, and foreign policy.”148
These groups do want the “historical continuity” of Islamic law and a “radical breach”
from the present.149 HT seeks to “to take over the rule in order to establish the Khilafah and
apply Islam,” and in Osama bin Laden’s 1996 Fatwa, “Declaration of War Against the
Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”, he calls for a jihad to “re-establish the
greatness of this Ummah and to liberate its occupied sanctities.”150
Response to HT and al-Qaeda Analysis
Consider the Source
Before delving into a more theoretical approach to understanding the differences between
HT and al-Qaeda, it is important to review some of the key differences raised by the previously
mentioned scholars, media, and governments. To begin, an exercise in evaluating how some of
the think tanks mentioned in this report predicted what would happen in Iraq will be beneficial in
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showing how realistic their analyses have been. Cohen, in September 2002, coauthored an
article about post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and how to bring “economic prosperity” to the country
once its “menacing arsenal of weapons of mass destruction” was removed.151 Cohen’s argument
also extends that, “presumably, a post-war U.S. military presence in Iraq and Iraq’s future
security forces will ensure that the new Iraqi government does not continue to develop WMD
and support terrorism;” despite the fact that this report was published four months before U.S.
forces began to bomb Baghdad. The ICG however, summarized various options for avoiding or
entering war against Iraq in early 2003. Directly stating that the issues surrounding the “Iraq
crisis” are more “finely balanced than most of those publicly supporting or opposing war are
prepared to acknowledge,” the ICG Board was divided and recognized the deep complexity of
the implications of Iraq.152 Presently, the major military operations in Iraq have ended, with no
reported caches of chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons in the country, and
with a thriving presence of Iraqi al-Qaeda. Thus, these think tanks’ predictive analyses
concerning Iraq appear to range from a balanced perspective to a predominantly bold pro-
invasion one.
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Really?
Now, turning to the weapons of mass destruction issue regarding HT and al-Qaeda
globally, the arguments made by Cohen and Baran seem imprecise. The troubling statements
implying HT’s predilection for chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear weapons as a
potential means for HT to come to power just do not seem to fit any message that HT has ever
officially issued. As well, the author has not seen these views corroborated elsewhere.153
While several pan-Islamist terrorist groups, with al-Qaeda the most notorious, have
proclaimed that acquiring WMD materials for “dirty bombs” and other terrorist attacks would
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contribute to their mission, HT’s membership base and Western legitimacy would be devastated
by such actions.154 If HT were to acquire and use WMD materials, Western governments would
immediately ban and label HT as a terrorist organization, likely stopping major international
financing of the group. As well, the membership base would suffer because many reportedly
join because HT is obstinately nonviolent and is, in some sense, the antithesis of al-Qaeda’s
means and methods.155 At the same time, the foundation of arguments about HT’s potential
usage of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, is shadowed by the overall
infeasibility that HT could acquire such weapons. As Charles Ferguson and William Potter, the
authors of The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, explain, presently, “al Qaeda is likely the only
network with all the requisite characteristics…to pursue nuclear terrorism of the most extreme
form.”156 Ferguson and Potter further elaborate that even for the heavily financed al-Qaeda,
acquiring the material, technology, and human resources required for nuclear weapons or
improvised nuclear devices is highly unlikely.
Al-Qaeda Parallels
On another note, especially in consideration of Baran and Cohen’s Congressional
consumers, the associating of HT to even some of al-Qaeda’s published phrases and using
parallel structure to fit the two groups into one narrative is apt to prove dangerous to HT’s
reputation. It is somewhat paradoxical that Baran wants to separate HT from al-Qaeda and
international terrorist organizations, yet clearly illustrates that HT is ideologically and
structurally like al-Qaeda. HT spokesman Dourehi explains that, “Hizb ut Tahrir has no
association with terrorism or acts of terrorism and refutes any notion of being a conveyor belt to
terrorism.”
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Analogy to “Staircase to Terrorism”
Fathali Moghaddam’s article, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” provides an interesting
metaphor of a narrowing staircase as the psychological process that individuals climb to commit
terrorist acts. Broadly, Moghaddam argues that the “vast majority” of “deprived and unfairly
treated” people stay on the ground floor of a narrowing five-story building.157 Individuals
perceive the building’s floors and doors open to them as they climb the staircase. He furthers
this analogous claim by stating that as these people climb the staircase, there are fewer options
until the “only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both.”158
Ground Floor: Psychological Interpretation of Material Conditions
Moghaddam’s ground floor consists of “hundreds of millions of people” who feel intense
frustration and shame.159 This frustration and shame is not necessarily material, and many may
feel a “perceived right to independence and the retention of indigenous cultures for a society, a
perception that other societies have achieved this goal, and a feeling that under present
conditions, the path to this goal has been blocked…”160 This statement deeply resounds with the
notion for an Islamic Caliphate from both HT and al-Qaeda. Moghaddam credits the
international mass media and increased access to it as having “fueled feelings of deprivation
among vast populations…” and that this anger has “given rise to greater sympathy for extremist
“antiestablishment” tactics.”161
The first description of “hundreds of millions of people” being on the ground floor of
Moghaddam’s building is too broad to be useful in the context of a pathway to terrorism.162
Because his ground floor includes people who feel deprived, but may or may not be absolutely
deprived, for a large variety of reasons, it is nearly impossible to make conclusions about HT or
Krause 31
al-Qaeda. However, for the individuals not on the ground floor or higher floors, it is difficult to
determine how these privileged people could be led to terrorism.
First Floor: Perceived Options to Fight Unfair Treatment
On the first floor of Moghaddam’s staircase, individuals have progressed from feeling
frustration and injustice to searching for solutions for the injustice. Moghaddam cites three
categories of justice from Tyler and Huo to define the perception of individuals at this level:
distributive justice, interactional justice, and procedural justice. Distributive justice, or the
“outcomes of justice processes”, and interactional justice, “the explanations that authorities
provide for their decisions and the considerations they show to the recipients of decisions” are
the two ideas that prompt individuals to recognize the overall procedural justice.163 That is,
people on floor one wrestle with how inherently fair the governmental system’s decision-making
appears to be. Overall, Moghaddam reasons that if individuals feel they have more choice in
their future—not always democracy, but a sociopolitical system that allows for “participation in
decision making and social mobility,” then these individuals will not progress to the next floor,
“Displacement of Aggression.”
For the earliest members of al-Qaeda, this stage is reasonable; before the men were
mujahideen in Afghanistan and then terrorists, they were united by their perceived injustices
(from the ground floor) and also by their perceived lack of options to defend Islam from
perceived Western imperialism in the Middle East and abroad. Because much of the Middle East
is ruled by autocratic regimes in not-free states that have poor civil liberties and political rights,
and the initial al-Qaeda members came Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other states, these men
perceived a lack of options to change their situation.164 Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri,
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despite their wealth and education, felt as though their religious needs were unmet by society and
had no traditional way of changing the system.165
Second and third wave members of al-Qaeda, however, have more perceived options at
floor one.166 Today, al-Qaeda members and cells are worldwide; in states with and without
perceived options to change. Al-Qaeda in Britain is a curious phenomenon because the British
have free and fair elections to determine leaders.167
In much the same way, HT’s 1953 roots in East Jerusalem were first planted by a lack of
perceived options for change in the Middle East.168 Today, Muslim youths of England, Central
Asia, South East Asia, and other regions have committed to HT not just because they perceive
few opportunities to escape or alleviate their perceived injustices. As mentioned, those from
England and some South East Asian countries have opportunities for political and social
mobility, and are geographically very far from where the Caliphate once was. This begs the
question as to how and why HT has become so global—surely there is no history of the
Caliphate spreading to England, so the Muslims living there ought not to feel obligated to revert
back to the Caliphate system of the Middle East.
Second Floor: Displacement of Aggression
This stage of the staircase analogy goes beyond feelings of frustration and of inequality to
fight unfairness. Moghaddam’s second floor contains individuals who displace their aggression
onto out-groups, such as the United States. In turn, the aggression is “channeled through direct
and indirect support for institutions and organizations that nurture authoritarian attitudes and
extremist behavior.”169 Both prospective HT and al-Qaeda members appear to go through this
stage.
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In fact, as al-Qaeda documents indicate and as Dr. Wahid, the HT Britain Chairman
Executive says, it is because they feel the Middle East is ruled by leaders corrupting Islamic
values and lending support to Western countries.170 Thus, by changing Western policies, HT
hopes that the Middle East has a greater chance at becoming Islamized. Clearly, some modern-
day HT and most al-Qaeda members are aggressive in speaking out about Western “colonial
empires,” but is this truly displaced? Moghaddam notes that “…without U.S. support, a number
of such [Middle Eastern] governments would probably collapse,” suggesting that HT’s and al-
Qaeda’s mantra of the U.S. “propping up” these governments is correct.171 So, while
Moghaddam’s argument for potential terrorists displacing their aggression for their local
governments’ for the West is on the right track, these groups are knowingly doing so because
they want to “kill the hand that feeds.”
Third Floor: “Moral Engagement”
Moghaddam boldly states that “terrorist organizations arise as a parallel or shadow world,
with a parallel morality that justifies “the struggle” to achieve the “ideal” society by any means
possible.”172 Essentially, “the struggle” refers to jihad, and “the ‘ideal’ society” is the Caliphate,
which are acceptable substitutions given the discussions of “jihad” and “Caliphate.” In
discussing “moral engagement,” it is important to consider varying viewpoints; al-Qaeda and HT
see themselves (but not each other) as morally “engaged” and their adversaries as the morally
disengaged, whereas the opposition to these groups view themselves as the morally engaged.
Because discussion of being “more moral” is beyond the scope of this project, it is incumbent to
focus on how people at this level acquire their feelings of moral engagement. Degrees of
morality are a moot point in view of how this study examines terrorist acts.
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Moghaddam suggests that recruits become phased into the group mentality with means
such as “…isolation, affiliation, secrecy, and fear…”173 Furthermore, the third floor’s occupants
engage in living parallel, secret lives from friends and family because of fear from government
persecution while closed societies lead these individuals to “the sense of absolute affiliation”.174
Here, Moghaddam’s ideas fall in line with al-Qaeda’s first and second waves of recruitment, but
can be very opposed to HT’s structure for moral engagement.175 If a prospective HT member is
in an open or closed society, then there are different recruitment methods employed for high
moral engagement.
First, this study will examine HT Britain, the alleged organizational headquarters of HT
worldwide. According to numerous former and active HT members, recruits go through up to
three years of an initiation process before becoming a “full member.”176 This process not does
involve fear or hazing, but rather indoctrination to al-Nabhani’s writings and small group or cell
meetings. Most recruits first become involved while looking for more devout Muslim
communities in universities or by word of mouth. Women and men meet in separate circles, and
are encouraged to wear traditional, conservative dress. Recruits are told to see everyone they
interact with as potential HT members and to seek out opportunities to persuade them to come to
meetings. These steps become the catalyst for leading a secret, parallel life. In fact, as one
woman states, her membership became “cult-like” due to constant recruiting of new members
and circle meetings.177
Another important consideration is the perceived closed societies of countries such as
Uzbekistan, which has the largest membership of HT in Central Asia.178 Uzbekistan is also
known for its gross violations of human rights and authoritarian rule by Islom Karimov.179
Though it is unclear precisely when HT spread from the Middle East to Central Asia, it is
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suspected that HT grew after the breakup of the Soviet Union.180 Familial clan structures were
the most likely vehicle through which the group spread. However, the government of
Uzbekistan (GOU) categorized HT as a terrorist group on account for its revolutionary
rhetoric.181 In the early 2000s, membership increased as a result of political prisoner culture.
The GOU detained and tortured suspected HT members for distributing leaflets or videos, while
women were left to maintain households. Women bonded over their shared experiences and help
spread HT throughout the unstable Ferghana Valley, located at the intersection of Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.182 The cell structure was in place in Uzbekistan, but many joined
HT because they longed for faith-based nonviolent solutions to their people’s frustrations. In
fact, much of HT Uzbekistan literature was not translated directly from Arabic or English texts
and did not focus on the Caliphate; it criticized the Karimov regime’s disregard for civil liberties,
human rights, and wealth disparity.183 Uzbek HT cells were morally engaged and wanted to
reform society, but not with violent means. Between al-Qaeda, the Islamic Jihad, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, and other terrorist groups, people longed for a group that took a moral
high ground against terror.
As Sayyid Qutb, writes in Milestones:
We must also free ourselves from the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts, jahili
traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of
jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its jahili characteristics,
is not worthy to be compromised with. Our aim is first to change ourselves so that we
may later change the society. Our foremost objective is to change the practices of
society.184
Qutb’s statement sounds remarkably like the initial phase of HT roadmap to the Caliphate, which
calls for “culturing to produce people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party.”185
With a core of believers reaching out to the ignorant, or jahili society, HT is aligned with moral
engagement on the third floor.
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Fourth Floor: Solidification of Categorical Thinking and the Perceived Legitimacy of the
Terrorist Organization
Moghaddam’s fourth floor leaves recruits with few perceived doors of opportunity and
the perception that there is “little or no opportunity to exit alive,” because recruits are either
long-term members in small cells or “foot soldiers” who will execute the terrorist act.186 For this
purpose, he writes that the cell structure is conducive to the “legitimization of the terrorist
organization and its goals,” solidifies the “belief that the ends justify the means,” and reinforces
the “us-versus-them view of the world.”187 This may be the case in the first and second waves of
al-Qaeda, but this formula does not quite work for HT. Al-Qaeda’s recruits were indoctrinated
in various training camps throughout Afghanistan and other states, and small cells were deployed
or were arranged to execute certain missions, such as the Hamburg cell before the events of
September 11, 2001.188 The so-called “third wave” of al-Qaeda, however operates more like a
large, decentralized franchise. Individuals approving of al-Qaeda’s philosophy but not
necessarily with an organized cell or directions from al-Qaeda’s higher command may go on to
commit acts of terror once they reach Moghaddam’s fifth floor. What is most striking about the
latest wave of al-Qaeda’s franchise is that the emergent cells may be part of al-Qaeda in name
only but still have the same underlying “ends justify the means” and “us-versus-them” mentality
as someone directly in contact with al-Qaeda elite.189 Burke notes that “[Al-Qaeda] is not about
being part of a group. It is a way of thinking about the world, a way of understanding events, of
interpreting and behaving.”190
Because this study reviews HT in parallel to Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism,”
when HT is not defined as a terrorist organization by the United States government, it is
important to not lose sight into the exercise that Moghaddam’s structure is primarily useful as a
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guideline. Member of HT perceive different doors and floors available to them than do al-Qaeda
recruits. This study aims to use his metaphor to help determine if HT will mobilize into a
terrorist group or one that commits other violence.
To this end, it would appear that there is a higher level than “moral engagement” for HT.
The study circles or claimed cell structure seem most predominant in Central Asia because of the
requisite secrecy to avoid imprisonment, but there is also evidence that more organized circles of
HT dominate HT United Kingdom.191 While there are no “foot soldiers” of HT to carry out
terrorist acts, in Britain and Indonesia, there are large rallying events and group protests.192 In
addition, at least HT Britain, HT France, and HT Denmark have utilized websites like
www.youtube.com to enlighten and to recruit interested individuals.193 Perhaps the most
compelling sign of this floor’s incompatibility with al-Qaeda comes from hearing from former
HT members who psychologically advanced past moral engagement. For several of these former
members, once they recognized how deeply into the socialized group was they had joined and
wanted to leave, they faced immense pressure internally and externally against leaving. At least
one former HT member went from this higher stage and quickly back to the first or ground floor
of the psychological staircase.194
In Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations, the cell structure has been both a bane and
a boon; the secretive nature of it keeps the cells hard for governments to enforce anti-terrorism
laws but also keeps the cells from brazenly publicizing a group whose membership can handily
turn the recruit into a political prisoner. At this floor, HT recruits have solidified categorical
thinking that HT is the ideal legitimate group to bring about peaceful change. At the same time,
there are many HT members who do not work for the Caliphate or do not see the Caliphate as
viably happening in their lifetimes.195 It would be logical to conclude that these people are on
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the third floor of moral engagement because they do not perceive the ultimate goals of HT as
legitimate possibilities.
Fifth Floor: The Terrorism Act and Sidestepping Inhibitory Mechanisms
Finally, Moghaddam argues that the psychological pressure and commitment towards the
terrorist act climaxes on the fifth floor as a result of “social categorization” and “psychological
distance.”196 The process of “social categorization” involves the terrorist treating every person
not in his or her terrorist group as an enemy combatant.197 The “us-versus-them” mentality from
the forth floor goes to its extreme at this level, even classifying foreign mothers and children as
enemies because they are not actively defending the terrorist organization’s beliefs. Also, the
greater the “psychological distance” a terrorist puts between himself or herself and the victim of
the attack will lower the chance “inhibitory mechanisms” would stop the terrorist from fully
executing the terrorist act.
This argument is especially suitable for al-Qaeda, as it prefers to strike civilians over
military targets for greater media attention and greater perception of fear in the community. Al-
Qaeda’s civilian fear logic is especially relevant in big attacks like the events of September 11,
2001, the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, and the bombings of U.S. Embassies in 1998.
Considering Crenshaw’s terrorist organizational belief that, “Generally, small organizations
resort to violence to compensate for what they lack in numbers. The imbalance between the
resources terrorists are able to mobilize and the power of the incumbent regime is a decisive
consideration in their decision making,” it is clear that al-Qaeda’s most notorious acts followed
this pattern and that HT’s large membership does not.198
Could HT ever perceive itself with doors of opportunity on the fifth floor? It does not
seem likely. While there are exceptions—only a couple of documented former HT members left
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the group to join al-Qaeda or another terrorist group—there is no non-violent equivalent to
committing a terrorist act. Neither al-Qaeda nor any other worldwide terrorist organization’s
actions have brought substantive political progress towards the re-creation of the Caliphate. HT
itself has no realistic outlined plan for reaching “Stage Three: The stage of establishing
government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to
the world,” and suggests that a divine revelation and the will of the people alone will reunite the
Caliphate.199
Gateway to Terrorism: Not Likely
After evaluating each step of Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism” model, it would be
reasonable to deduce that HT’s members are not going down the same path as al-Qaeda did to
recruit members and initiate attacks. While HT’s claimed ideal of a recreated Islamic Caliphate
is, perhaps, the most touted of its many convictions, the vast majority of members in HT do not
actively pursue the Caliphate and condemn violence. In fact, most HT members join because it
is exactly what al-Qaeda is not: a stubbornly non-violent organization promoting a return to
Islamic doctrine and increased Islamic devotion throughout the youth of the world. Jessica Stern
writes that “violence…restores the dignity of humiliated youth…it is a marketing device and a
method for rousing the troops.”200 In HT seems to prefer to “rouse the troops” in an altogether
different way than al-Qaeda. HT’s “troops” are the vocal members who stage protests, engage in
the online community, and distribute leaflets elucidating their views on modern society.
HT initially took part in unsuccessful political coups, but after the group’s strategy
changed for greater awareness in their aims, membership significantly increased. The Leninist
model that HT suggests will help bring about the Caliphate is much different that al-Qaeda’s
forceful, proposed institutional change. For over fifty years, HT has spread its method and
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rationale for change. Yet, no one country seems likely to have a peaceful change of power to the
Caliph system. Perhaps Crenshaw depicts HT’s eventual fall because its views are just too
extreme for the general public, “Why does an organization lack the potential to attract enough
followers to change government policy or overthrow it? One possibility is that the majority of
the population does not share the ideological views of the resisters, who occupy a political
position so extreme that their appeal is inherently limited.”201
Big Picture: Analytical Bias
One problem with predictive threat analysis is that groups or individuals who do not
commit violent actions always have the potential to do so. Yet, the President of the United
States, politicians, and intelligence analysts are charged with protecting U.S. and U.S. interests
by identifying the pressing transnational threats of today and of the future, indeed “no mean
feat.”202 The “publish or perish” mentality in the academic world can and often does correspond
to strategic threat analysis in the intelligence and policy field, as well.
A bias involved in naming threats is evident in some of the policy suggestions given by
Cohen and Baran. Cohen recommends that “the U.S. should expand intelligence collection on
Hizb ut-Tahrir” and work together with foreign intelligence agencies.203 More collection may be
helpful for the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to better understand HT, but here Cohen
signals that whatever the current intelligence on HT is, it is not enough. He warns that some
“regimes…will attempt to portray Hizb as a terrorist organization with links to Osama bin
Laden,” but does not explicitly state that this is false, which may mislead the reader.204 In fact,
later in his essay, Cohen states that “Hizb may launch terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and
allies, operating either alone or in cooperation with other global terrorist groups, such as al-
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Qaeda,” which implies that his prior statement that seemingly dismisses Central Asian
governmental assessments may be accurate.205 Central Asian states do label HT as a terrorist
organization with links to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, but there is no widely-accepted
documented case of Central Asian HT activity with al-Qaeda.206 The ICG, in particular, notes
that HT and al-Qaeda “reject each other as profoundly wrong on theological questions,” and then
suggests that, “lumping them [HT] with violent groups such as al-Qaeda merely undermines the
campaign against terrorism and gives ammunition to those radicals who claim that the West is
acting against free speech and Islam in general.”207
Other U.S. policy prescriptions by Cohen include aid with economic reform, democracy
building initiatives, and media that “discredits radicals and encourages moderates.”208 Cohen’s
suggestions of economic reform and democracy building are largely responsibilities of the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Since Cohen’s article was
published in May of 2003, USAID monetary aid to Uzbekistan, the most populous Central Asian
state which is considered the stronghold of HT efforts in Central Asia, has gone from
approximately 35 million dollars in Fiscal Year 2004 to approximately 8.5 million dollars.209
Overall USAID assistance for Central Asia has declined over 25 percent.210 It is important to
note that US financial assistance to Uzbekistan boomed after September 11, 2001 when Karimov
was the first Central Asian leader to offer military and airbase support. However, in the spring
of 2005, USAID contributions and US foreign policy relations with Uzbekistan significantly
dropped due to a state-sponsored killing of numerous political protesters in Andijon. Though
Karimov claimed that the victims were Islamic terrorists, he forbade an international
investigation of the incident and subsequently prohibited the US and coalition forces from
utilizing Uzbekistan’s strategic airbase near Afghanistan.211
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Rashid puts forth an innovative policy idea of legalizing HT as a political party,
especially in those states in which it is banned. By legalizing the group, it would pressure the
party’s “leadership to deal with local problems and articulate concrete economic and political
policies rather than rely on vague millenarian promises.”212 Furthermore, Rashid argues that if
HT were a legally authorized party, it would be much “less likely to forge links with other
radical Islamic groups that do advocate violence.”213 In other words, Rashid hopes that HT
would be accountable for its promises and also be on its best behavior to maintain relationships
with its followers.
Though Rashid’s solution almost seems like a panacea for many of the problems HT has
globally, it would take significant effort and compromises of both governments and of HT. In
Central Asia, the only state that permits Islamic groups to run as political parties is Tajikistan,
which suffered through a civil war during 1992-1997 in part because of religious politics. As for
HT, it claims to not recognize the legitimacy of the political processes in any country today, and
that is why HT leaders have not run for office. Further compounding the problem of legalization
is that during HT’s early history, there were Middle Eastern coup attempts allegedly led by HT
members. While HT has maintained its innocence, no other group has been held responsible for
the plots. As well, in HT’s recent history, HT has been blamed for attacks that may not have
been instigated by its members; other groups like al-Qaeda and the IMU are possible initiators,
but as with the case with many Central Asian legal practices, the truth may never be known.
Finally, for HT to take on a legal status in Central Asia would be an enormous change for
Islam in those states. In 1917, during the Bolshevik revolution, the number of mosques in all of
the Russian empire numbered around 20,000. By 1935, only a total of 84 mosques were in
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.214 Post-World War II, the “Soviets had reduced Islam
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to the status of a cult,” and it was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union did Islam fully
become legal in the region.215
Conclusion
While this paper offers no solution as to how governments ought to manage HT, it does
attempt to address the challenges of analysis of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in careful consideration of falling
into the trap of the al-Qaeda narrative. That Ahmed Rashid and Suja Taji-Farouki’s detailed pre-
9/11 analyses of HT were available and somehow did not make a significant impact on the post-
9/11 HT reports speaks volumes as to the analytic biases that caused these researchers, media,
and governments to frame HT in the al-Qaeda narrative. Upon review of both Islamist groups’
goal to reunify the Caliphate, analysts seemed to articulate that HT may invariably take the path
of violence in the future. The foundings and methodologies of HT and al-Qaeda, however, lead
to an alternative analysis. Al-Qaeda was formed as a reaction to violence and has always
committed violence to justify its goal. Yet, HT’s insistence on non-violence was a reaction to
dissatisfaction with the Muslim Brotherhood. Political Islam is far-reaching; the Caliphate that
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Last formal Caliphate, with a Caliph as leader “who receives obedience from all and has
religious authority” exists.218 Future references to the Caliphate are “largely symbolic posts for
foreign policy purposes.” 219
1909
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani born in Ijzim, Haifa, the Jordanian controlled part of Jerusalem.
1924
Kemal Ataturk abolishes final office of the Caliphate in series of new Turkish reforms.
1953
Taquiddin al-Nabhani breaks away from Muslim Brotherhood and establishes Hizb-ut-Tahrir
1964
Founding Hizb-ut-Tahrir member, Ahmad Daour, wins Jordanian parliament seat.220
1968
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members allegedly stage coup in Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. 221
Ahmad Daour arrested for involvement in Jordanian coup attempt. 222
1969
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members allegedly stage second coup in Jordan. 223
Hizb-ut-Tahrir membership in Jordan typically results in six-year jail sentence.224
1971
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members allegedly stage third coup in Jordan. 225
1972
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members allegedly stage second coup in southern Iraq. 226
1974
Palestinian Hizb-ut-Tahrir member, Salih Sirriya, allegedly initiates pre-coup attack on Egyptian
armory of a military academy.227
Egypt bans Hizb-ut-Tahrir. 228
1977
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani dies and is replaced with Palestinian Yusuf Sheikh Abdul Qadeem
Zaloom.
1983
Hizb-ut-Tahrir cells “broken up” by Tunisian government. 229
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Hizb-ut-Tahrir chapter launches in Indonesia. 230
1988
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members allegedly stage coup in Tunisia and Iraq.
Al-Qaeda founded by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
1990
Saddam Hussein executes Hizb-ut-Tahrir members who call for Islamic state. 231
1991
Tunisian government arrests 80 Hizb-ut-Tahrir members. 232
Collapse of the Soviet Union.
Al-Qaeda moves to Sudan and establishes training camps.
Mid-1990s
Hizb-ut-Tahrir spreads to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. 233
1993
Al-Qaeda attacks World Trade Center with car bomb.
Black Hawk helicopters shot down by Somali militia, which was allegedly trained by al-Qaeda.
1994
Ten Hizb-ut-Tahrir members convicted of King Hussein of Jordan assassination attempt, eight
decisions overturned and two tried in absentia.234
1996
Hizb-ut-Tahrir “splinter group,” Akramiyyah formed in Ferghana Valley. 235
Bin Laden leaves Sudan and returns to Afghanistan.
1998
Bin Laden and associates declare a fatwa against the U.S. and Israel.
Al-Qaeda bombs U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 220 people.
1999
Hizb-ut-Tahrir banned in Syria, with extensive arrests continuing to 2002.236
Tashkent Hizb-ut-Tahrir begins new party, Hizb-an-Nusra (Party of Victory). 237
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2000
Hizb-ut-Tahrir chapter launches in Pakistan. 238
“Widespread arrests” of Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in Tajikistan. 239
Al-Qaeda suicide bombers attack the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, killing 17 sailors.
2001
400 women of imprisoned male Hizb-ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan members protest and up to 80 are
beaten and arrested by government authorities. 240
Al-Qaeda operatives launch four parallel hijacking attacks that result in over 3,000 civilian
deaths. Three planes hit the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon; while one plane
crashes in rural Pennsylvania.
U.S. military and coalition forces begin aerial strikes in Afghanistan, targeting al-Qaeda training
camps and Taliban strongholds.
Briton Richard Reid, pledging allegiance to bin Laden, attempts to bring explosives hidden in his
shoes on commercial aircraft.
2002
Three British citizens arrested in Egypt for Hizb-ut-Tahrir membership. 241
Decline of Hizb-ut-Tahrir activity in Central Asia observed. 242
2003
Germany bans Hizb-ut-Tahrir due to “anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli propaganda.” 243
Denmark Hizb-ut-Tahrir leader, Fadi Abdullatif, distributes anti-Semitic leaflets and breaks anti-
racism laws. 244
U.S. and coalition forces invade Iraq to eradicate alleged weapons of mass destruction and to
topple Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir opens new Iraqi branch with U.S. and coalition forces removal of Saddam
Hussein. 245
2004
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, a supporter of al-Qaeda, explodes ten bombs on Madrid
trains and kills 191 people.
2005
In London, three trains and a bus are bombed by groups linked or inspired by al-Qaeda, killing
52 people.
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